The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, and Noam Nisan: when the number of alternatives is three, for any neutral voting rule that is far from any dictatorship, there exists a voter such that a random manipulation-that is, the true preferences and the strategic vote are all drawn i.i.d., uniformly at random-will succeed with a probability of Ω( 1 n ), where n is the number of voters. However, it seems that the techniques used to prove this theorem can not be fully extended to more than three alternatives. In this paper, we give a more limited result that does apply to four or more alternatives. We give a sufficient condition for a voting rule to be randomly manipulable with a probability of Ω( 1 n ) for at least one voter, when the number of alternatives is held fixed. Specifically, our theorem states that if a voting rule r satisfies 1. homogeneity, 2. anonymity, 3. non-imposition, 4. a cancelingout condition, and 5. there exists a stable profile that is still stable after one given alternative is uniformly moved to different positions; then there exists a voter such that a random manipulation for that voter will succeed with a probability of Ω( 1 n ). We show that many common voting rules satisfy these conditions, for example any positional scoring rule, Copeland, STV, maximin, and ranked pairs.
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INTRODUCTION
If a group of agents needs to decide among a set of alternatives, they can do so by voting over the alternatives. First, agents are asked to submit their preferences (usually in the form of linear orders over the alternatives); then, the winner is selected based on the reported preferences according to a voting rule. One complication in this process is manipulation, that is, a voter can sometimes obtain a better result for herself by declaring her preferences insincerely. One may try to prevent this by creating a rule that is strategy-proof, that is, a rule in which reporting one's true preferences is always optimal. Unfortunately, when there are three or more alternatives and preferences are unrestricted, no rule that satisfies non-imposition (for every alternative, there exist votes that would make that alternative win) and non-dictatorship (the rule does not simply always choose the most-preferred alternative of a single fixed voter) is strategy-proof, that is, a manipulation always exists. This fundamental impossibility result in mechanism design is known as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [10, 13] .
Although a manipulation is guaranteed to exist (for reasonable rules), in order for the manipulating agent to use it, she must also be able to find it. Recent research has studied whether finding a manipulation can be made computationally hard, thereby erecting a computational barrier against manipulation. In early work [2, 1] , it was shown that when the number of alternatives is not bounded, the second-order Copeland and STV rules are hard to manipulate, respectively. More recent research has studied how to modify other existing rules to make them hard to manipulate [3, 7] . Also, it has been shown that richer variants of the manipulation problem (manipulation by coalitions of weighted voters) can be hard even with a constant number of alternatives [5, 11] .
However, all of these hardness results are worst-case results. That is, they suggest that any algorithm will require superpolynomial time to solve some instances. However, this does not mean that there is no efficient algorithm that can find a manipulation for most instances. Indeed, several recent results suggest that finding manipulations is usually easy. Procaccia and Rosenschein have shown that, when the number of alternatives is a constant, manipulation of positional scoring rules is easy even with respect to "junta" distributions, which arguably focus on hard instances [12] . Conitzer and Sandholm have given some sufficient conditions under which manipulation is easy and argue that these conditions are usually satisfied in practice [4] . Zuckerman et al. have given manipulation algorithms with the property that if they fail to find a manipulation when one exists, then, if the manipulators are given some additional vote weights, the algorithm will succeed [14] .
Following this line of research, a quantitative version of the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem was recently proved [9] . This theorem states that, when there are three alternatives, for any neutral voting rule that is far from any dictatorship, a random manipulation-that is, the true preferences and the strategic vote are all drawn i.i.d., uniformly at random-will succeed with a probability of Ω( 1 n ), where n is the number of voters. This is perhaps one of the nicest approaches so far in trying to show that it is usually easy to find manipulations; unfortunately, it seems that the technique used in the proof of the theorem cannot be easily extended to four or more alternatives. In this paper, we obtain a similar result that does extend to four or more alternatives, albeit under different assumptions.
After recalling some basic definitions and notations in Section 2, we prove our main result in Section 3. Instead of considering neutral voting rules that are far from a dictatorship, our theorem applies to all voting rules that satisfy the following five conditions: 1. homogeneity (if all the votes are multiplied by the same factor, the outcome does not change), 2. anonymity (the rule treats all voters equally), 3. non-imposition, 4. a canceling-out condition (if the set of all linear orders is added to the votes, then the outcome does not change), and 5. there exists a stable profile that is still stable after one given alternative is uniformly moved to different positions (and a profile is stable if slight perturbations do not change the winner). Our theorem states that for any fixed number of alternatives, if a voting rule satisfies the five conditions, then there exists a voter such that a random manipulation for that voter succeeds with a probability of Ω(
n
). Finally, in Section 5, we show that some common voting rules, including all positional scoring rules, STV, Copeland, maximin, and ranked pairs, satisfy the five conditions.
PRELIMINARIES
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be the set of alternatives (or candidates). A linear order on C is a transitive, antisymmetric, and total relation on C. The set of all linear orders on C is denoted by L(C). An n-voter profile P on C consists of n linear orders on C. That is, P = (V1, . . . , Vn), where for every i ≤ n, Vi ∈ L(C). The set of all profiles on C is denoted by P (C). In the remainder of the paper, m denotes the number of alternatives and n denotes the number of voters.
A voting rule r is a function from the set of all profiles on C to C, that is, r : P (C) → C. The following are some common voting rules.
(Positional) scoring rules: Given a scoring vector
where j is the rank of c in V . For
The rule will select c ∈ C so that s(P, c) is maximized. Two examples of scoring rules are Borda, for which the scoring vector is (m − 1, m − 2, . . . , 0), and plurality, for which the scoring vector is (1, 0, . . . , 0).
2.
Copeland: For any two alternatives ci and cj , we can simulate a pairwise election between them, by seeing how many votes prefer ci to cj , and how many prefer cj to ci. Then, an alternative receives one point for each win in a pairwise election. Typically, an alternative also receives half a point for each pairwise tie. The winner is the alternative who has the highest score.
STV:
The election has |C| rounds. In each round, the alternative that gets the minimal plurality score drops out, and is removed from all of the votes (so that votes for this alternative transfer to another alternative in the next round). The last-remaining alternative is the winner.
Maximin:
Let N (ci, cj) denote the number of votes that rank ci ahead of cj . The winner is the alternative c that maximizes min{N (c, c ) : c ∈ C, c = c}.
5.
Bucklin: An alternative c's Bucklin score is the smallest number k such that more than half of the votes rank c among the top k alternatives. The winner is the alternative who has the smallest Bucklin score. (Sometimes, ties are broken by the number of votes that rank an alternative among the top k.)
Ranked pairs:
This rule first creates an entire ranking of all the alternatives. N (ci, cj ) is defined as for the maximin rule. In each step, we will consider a pair of alternatives ci, cj that we have not previously considered; specifically, we choose the remaining pair with the highest N (ci, cj). We then fix the order ci > cj , unless this contradicts previous orders that we fixed (that is, it violates transitivity). We continue until we have considered all pairs of alternatives (hence we have a full ranking). The alternative at the top of the ranking wins. For two voting rules f and g, let Δm,n(f, g) be the distance between two voting rules f and g w.r.t. m alternatives and n voters, defined as follows:
Here, P is drawn uniformly from L(C) n . The following theorem (proved by Friedgut et al. [9] ) states that when there are three alternatives, if the distance between a neutral voting rule r and any dictatorship is at least > 0, then i Mi,3,n(r) is Ω( 2 ). 
This theorem implies that for any voting rule that is -far away from any dictatorship for any number of voters, there exists a voter i such that with a probability of Ω( 1 n ), a random manipulation for voter i is successful.
MAIN THEOREM
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that all the distributions are uniform. For any set S, let L(S) be all the linear orders over S. Given a linear order V over S and S n ⊂ S, let V | S n be the restriction of V to S n . Similarly, let P | S n be the restriction of the profile P to S n . For any subset of agents I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and any n-voter profile P = {V1, . . . , Vn}, let P (I) = {Vi : i ∈ I}. In this paper, we focus on anonymous rules (that is, rules that do not distinguish among the voters), so that we can represent a profile as a (multi)set rather than a vector. Let iP be the profile that is obtained from P by replacing each vote with i copies of it. A rule r is homogenous if for any P and i, r(P ) = r(iP ).
Definition 1
Given a voting rule r that satisfies anonymity and homogeneity, a profile P is stable if there exists > 0 such that for any i ∈ N and any profile P with |P | < i|P |,
We emphasize that stability is a property of a profile with respect to a rule, not just of a rule. If fractional votes are allowed, then a profile is stable (with respect to a rule) if there exists an such that if we add a set of votes whose size is at most times the size of the original set, then the winner does not change. However, we are interested in the case where fractional votes are not allowed. This is the reason that we need the i in the definition. Let Cm = {c1, . . . , cm} be the set of alternatives.
Definition 2

Definition 3 Define the merging function
where 
We now define a function Dm that maps any profile P of n votes to another profile Dm(P ) such that the position of cm is uniformly redistributed, while keeping the restriction of the profile to Cm−1 = {c1, . . . , cm−1} unchanged. The size of the resulting profile is still n; however, some of the votes in the resulting profile are fractional. The set L(Cm) of linear orders of the alternatives has m! elements; let li denote the ith linear order (1 ≤ i ≤ m!). Then, any profile P can be written as m! i=1 pili, for some pi that indicate how many times each linear order occurs. (This is making use of the fact that we only consider anonymous rules.)
Definition 4 For any profile
be the profile of all linear orders, each appearing exactly once. We say a rule r satisfies canceling out if for any profile P , r(P ∪ P ) = r(P ).
We are now ready to present our main result. This result states that any rule that satisfies certain conditions is, in a sense, frequently manipulable. (The precise definition of "frequently manipulable" is the same as that used by Friedgut et al.) Theorem 2 Suppose that a voting rule r that chooses an alternative from Cm = {c1, . . . , cm} satisfies the following properties:
1. Homogeneity.
Anonymity.
Non-imposition, which means that for any n, any alternative
ci, there exists a profile P of n votes such that r(P ) = ci.
4. Canceling out.
There exists a profile P such that: (a) P and Dm(P ) are both stable, (b) r(P ) = c1, and (c) r(Dm(P )) = c2.
Then, there exists > 0 such that for any n ∈ N,
Mi,m,n(r) > . Here, does not depend on n.
We note that Theorem 1 [9] relates the frequency of manipulation under any neutral voting rule to the distance between the rule and dictatorships, when the number of alternatives is three. In contrast, the main theorem in this paper (Theorem 2) applies to any number of alternatives, and implies that the frequency of manipulation under any voting rule satisfying the five conditions in Theorem 2 is non-negligible. The conditions in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are not comparable. Theorem 1 assumes neutrality, and Theorem 2 does not. The assumption of anonymity in Theorem 2 is related to the dependence on the distance to the dictatorships in Theorem 1. Admittedly, Condition 5 in Theorem 2 is less natural than all the other conditions. In Section 5, we will show that many of the common rules satisfy the five conditions (including Condition 5) in Theorem 2.
PROOF OF MAIN THEOREM
The proof of our main theorem follows the line of the proof of Theorem 1 in [9] . First, for any voting rule r, we define the quantity M m−1 n (r) to be the probability that the winners under r for two randomly drawn profiles are the same, given that the restrictions of the two profiles to Cm−1 = {c1, . . . , cm−1} are the same. Second, we prove that, for any voting rule r satisfying the five conditions in Theorem 2 and any fixed number of alternatives m, M m−1 n (r) is non-negligible, meaning that it is always strictly larger than some positive constant (Lemma 2). Third, we bound the frequency of manipulation below by M m−1 n (r). The first and third steps are natural extensions of their counterparts in [9] . However, the technique used to prove the second part is quite different. For this part, we bound the probability that a randomly drawn profile satisfies the following two conditions below by a constant. 1. The profile is approximately multiple copies of the profile P in Condition 5. 2. After "shifting" cm in each vote in the profile to a random position in the vote, the new profile is approximately multiple copies of Dm(P ) with a non-negligible probability.
We first present a basic result in probability theory that we will need in the proof. The result is a corollary of a known multivariate version of the central limit theorem; this multivariate version can be found in Dudley [6] 1 . 
Lemma 1 Suppose each random variable
Proof of Lemma 1: We first note that
This inequality holds because
where P(i) is the i-th component of P. It is easy to check that the covariance matrix of X is positive definite, which means its rank is m − 1. Therefore from Theorem 9.5.6 (the central limit theorem) and Theorem 9.5.7 in [6] , when n goes to infinity,
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 9.3.6 in [6] , because the probability density function of a multivariate normal distribution is continuous, we can prove that when n goes to infinity,
Since
2 This lemma tells us that given "displacements" q1, . . . , qm, there is some δq 1 ,...,qm such that when n goes to infinity, the probability that for each i, ti(P ) (the number of times xi occurs in P ) is within √ n of its expectation n/m plus the displacement qi √ n, is at least δq 1 ,...,qm .
We now define a quantity M m−1 n (r). We recall that for any profile P over the set of alternatives Cm = {c1, . . . , cm}, P |C m−1 is the profile obtained by removing cm from each vote in P . We will first show that when n goes to infinity, M m−1 n (r) is bounded below by a quantity that does not depend on n. Then, we will relate M
Mi,m,n(r), which will show that the latter is bounded below by a quantity that does not depend on n. 
Lemma 2 If r satisfies all five conditions in
By Lemma 1 we know that there exists δq1,...,q m! such that
We first make the following claim.
Claim 1 For any
Proof of Claim 1: Since for any profile P ∈ Sn, any i ≤ m!, the number of li in P is more than
we can decompose P into the following three parts.
1. The "canceling-out" part:
2. The "main" part MP (P ): from the definition of the S, in P (CP (P )) we can find
Therefore r(P ) = r(P (MP (P )) + P (NP (P ))) canceling out
(End of the proof of Claim 1.) 2 For any pair (P1, P2) such that P1|C m−1 = P2|C m−1 , we can represent this pair as (P1, K2) where K2 ∈ {1, . . . , m} n . Here, the ith component of K2 indicates the position of cm in the ith vote in P2. We remember that for the earlier-defined merging function
For any P1 ∈ S, we further decompose the canceling-out part and the main part as follows. 
What we will do next is to define a function S n : Sn → 2 {1,...,m} n . That is, for every profile P1 ∈ Sn, and every K2 ∈ {1, . . . , m} n , the function S n determines whether or not K2 ∈ S n (P1). We want this function to have the following properties:
1. There exists some n and some δ > 0 such that for any n > n ,
(that is, if we are drawing an element uniformly at random from {1, . . . , m} n , then with a probability of at least δ the element we draw is in S n (P1) ).
For every
Again we make use of Lemma 1. This time we apply the lemma to the K2 component. We recall that K2 takes values in {1, . . . , m} n . We require that for every P1 ∈ Sn, for every K2 ∈ S n (P1), for every li, each j ∈ {1, . . . , m} occurs approximately the same number of times in K2 (A(P1, li) ), and each j ∈ {1, . . . , m} occurs approximately the same number of times in K2(B(P1, li) ). (For any C ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, K2(C) is the subvector of K2 consisting of the components in C.)
We will first define S n,A,
, which are the projections of the K2 ∈ S n (P1) onto the components in A(P1, li) and B(P1, li), respectively. The definition is as follows: K 2 is in S n,A,l i (P1) if and only if for any j ≤ m,
where qmax = max{q1, . . . , q m! }.
We are now ready to define S n . We define S n (P1) to be the set of profiles such that K2 ∈ S n (P1) if and only if for any i ≤ m!, each of {1, . . . , m} occurs approximately equally many times in K2 (A(P1, li) ) and K2(B (P1, li) ). That is:
We note that we are ignoring the the K2 component of the negligible part NP (P1).
We will now prove that properties 1 and 2 above hold. For property 1, since each element of K2 is drawn independently, K2 can be determined in the following 2m! + 1 steps: first draw the K2 component of A(P1, l1), then that of A(P1, l2), and so on, until B(P1, l m! ), in the last step draw all the remaining components (the ones in the negligible part) arbitrarily. By Lemma 1, there exists δ0,...,0 such that when n goes to infinity, for the step concerning A (P1, li) , the probability that its K2 component is in S n,A,l i (P1) is larger than δ0,...,0 (and similarly for the B (P1, li) ). Hence, 2m! . We now make the following claim.
Claim 2 For any
P1 ∈ Sn, any K2 ∈ S n (P1), r(M (P1, K2)) = c2.
Proof of Claim 2:
We first prove that for any K2 ∈ S n (P1), M (P1, K2)(CP (P1)) (that is, the projection of the profile resulting from the merge operator onto the elements that originally canceled out) still approximately cancels out. Then, we prove that M (P1, K2)(MP (P1)) (the projection of the new profile onto the elements that were originally in the main part) consists approximately of multiple copies of Dm (Ps) . Then, by a similar argument as the one in Claim 1, it follows that r(M (P1, K2) 
First, for any li, the number of votes li in M (P1, K2)(CP (P1)) can be bounded below as follows: 
times by the definition of S n,A,l i j (P1), and be-
So, we can construct a new canceling-out part in M (P1, K2) that contains most of the old canceling-out part CP (P1). That is, there exists NCP (P1, K2) ⊆ CP (P1) such that
The part of the old canceling-out part that is not in the new cancelingout part will turn out to be negligible. Second, the number of times that any order li occurs in M (P1, K2)(MP (P1)) can be bounded below as follows:
This is true by a similar argument as before: for any i ≤ m!, the votes li in M (P1, K2)(MP (P1)) result from m sets in the original profile: for each j, votes li in the new profile result from the votes in P1(B(P1, li j ) ) in the original profile. Therefore
The first equality follows from the fact that
The last inequality follows from the fact that √ n > 4 √ n. So, we can construct a new main part in M (P1, K2) that contains most of the old main part MP (P1). That is, there exists
We let NNP (P1, K2) denote the set of all the remaining votesconsisting of the votes from the old canceling-out part that are not in the new canceling-out part, the votes from the old main part that are not in the new main part, and the votes from the old negligible
It follows that:
(End of the proof of Claim 2.) 2 To conclude, there exists a δ > 0 which does not depend on n such that lim n→∞ P r((P1, S n (P1)) : P1 ∈ Sn) > δ, and for any P1 ∈ Sn, any K2 ∈ S n (P1), r(P1) = c1 and r(M (P1, K2)) = c2. So there exists n ∈ N s.t. when n > n , P r((P1, S n (P1)) : P1 ∈ Sn) > δ 2 . Notice that for any n ∈ N,
(End of the proof for Lemma 3.) 2
We now obtain a lower bound on
Proof of Lemma 3:
This is an extension of Lemma 3 in [9] 
(here, x is a vector of n votes drawn uniformly at random), as follows: 
as claimed. Given any X ⊆ {1, . . . , m} n , we define the upper edges of X in direction i to be the set of pairs (v, v i ) such that v ∈ X, and after increasing the ith component of v to v i , the resulting element will be out of X.
Definition 7 For any X ⊆ {1, . . . , m}
n , any i ≤ n, let the upper edges ∂i(X) in direction i be defined as follows: 
, voter i changes the outcome from cj to c1, and he prefers the latter.
j = m and cm
, voter i changes the outcome from c1 to cm, and he prefers the latter because his true preference is M (x m−1 (i), vi).
, voter i changes the outcome from cm to c1, and he prefers the latter, for the following reason. By assumption, even an agent with preferences M (x m−1 (i), vi) prefers c1 to cm; and i's true prefer-
, which is a successful manipulation for voter i. Additionally, for any
That is, all of the manipulations are distinct. Therefore,
Mi,m,n(r)
Next, we prove an extension of Lemma 8 in [9] .
Claim 4 For any disjoint
A, B ⊆ {1, . . . , m} n , we have |∂(A)| + |∂(B)| ≥ m −n |A||B|.
Proof of Claim 4:
The proof is an easy generalization of the proof of Lemma 8 in [9] . The only difference is that in our claim the lattice is {1, . . . , m} n instead of {0, 1, 2} n , and the coefficient of the FKG [8] inequality is m −n . We now present the proof in full. {1, . . . , m} n can be organized as a distributive lattice in the following way: , b1) , . . . , min(an, bn)).
. , bn) if and only if for all
For any A, we will find a monotonic set A -that is, for any a ∈ A and a a, a is also in A -in this lattice such that |A | = |A|, and there exists a one-to-one correspondence d between A and A with the following properties. For any a ∈ A, there is a path p(a) from a to d(a). (In a path over the lattice, any two adjacent elements (a1, a2) differ only in one component, and a1 < a2. For example, (1, 1, 1), (1, 3, 1), (1, 3, 2) is a path.) We will show that for our definitions of d(a) and p(a), for any a = a , any adjacent pair a1 < a2 on p(a) and any adjacent pair a 1 < a 2 on p(a ), either a1 = a 1 or a2 = a 2 . That is, if we choose one pair of adjacent elements from the path of a, and choose another pair of adjacent elements from the path of a , then the two pairs of elements are not equal. We will similarly define d(b) and p(b) for any b ∈ B, with the same properties.
To do this, we use a variant of the "component-wise shifting up" from [9] . Given A, we will define an n-step path, starting at A0 = A. In step i, for any v−i, let Nv −i denote the set of all elements in {1, . . . , m} that extend v−i to an element of Ai−1, that is, (which is in A ) is defined to be d(a) . We note that the length of a path can be less than n, because it is possible that in some step i, the ith component is not shifted up.
We now prove the property (stated more precisely above) that adjacent pairs of elements in different paths are never equal. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that it does not hold. Then, there exist a = a , an adjacent pair a1 < a2 in p(a), and an adjacent pair a 1 < a 2 in p(a ), such that a1 = a 1 , a2 = a 2 . Then, since a1 and a2 are adjacent, they differ in exactly one component-let us say, the ith component. For any j ≤ n and a ∈ A, let pj(a) be the jth element  along the trace of a, that is, fj (fj−1(. . . f1(a) . . .) ). (We note that, unlike the path starting at a, the trace starting at a can have duplicates.) We now know that a1 = a 1 = pi−1(a) = pi−1(a ) and a2 = a 2 = pi(a) = pi(a ) (otherwise, the ith component could not have shifted). However, this is impossible, because for any j ≤ n, fj is a one-one function, which implies that for any a = a and any j ≤ n, pj(a) = pj(a ). Thus we have derived the desired contradiction, thereby proving the adjacent-pairs-arenever-equal property. We can similarly prove the property for B.
We now prove that A is monotonic. We prove the following claim by induction on the step of the shifting-up process. The claim states that in any step i ≤ n, for any vn−i ∈ {1, . . . , m} {i+1,...,n} , the restriction of Ai to vn−i is monotonic. Here, the restriction of Ai to vn−i, denoted by A| v n−i , is defined as follows: 
) . Now, the induction assumption states that
) is monotonic; therefore, for any
Hence, the claim holds for i = k + 1, and we have proven the induction step. Thus, the claim holds for all i ≤ n.
(End of the proof of Claim 5.) 2 Similarly, B is monotonic. Now we can apply the FKG inequality [8] to A and B . It follows that
B \B), and hence
|∂(A)|+|∂(B)| ≥ |(A \A)∪(B \B)| ≥ |A ∩B | ≥ m
−n |A||B| (End of the proof of Claim 4.) 2 For any r satisfying all the five conditions, we now apply Inequality (2), Claim 4, and Equation (1) to obtain:
Mi,m,n(r)
(End of the proof of Lemma 3.) 2 We are ready to prove the main result. Proof of Theorem 2: By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and condition 2 and 3, we know that for any number n of voters, there exists a successful manipulation, which means that for any n,
From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we know that there exists some n ∈ N and a constant δ (that does not depend on n) such that for any n > n ,
, δ}, and the right-hand side of the inequality is a constant that does not depend on n. 2
APPLYING THE RESULT TO SOME COM-MON VOTING RULES
In this section, we show that for nontrivial positional scoring rules (with 4 or more alternatives), Copeland (with 5 or more alternatives), STV, maximin, and ranked pairs (all with 3 or more alternatives), the conditions in Theorem 2 hold (thereby showing that those rules are frequently manipulable). (We note that [9] already proves a quite general result for the case of neutral rules with exactly 3 alternatives.) For the results in this section, ties can be broken in any way that is consistent with anonymity. A positional scoring rule is nontrivial, if the components of its scoring vector (v (1) All that remains to show is that Condition 5 holds for (nontrivial) positional scoring rules, Copeland with 5 or more alternatives, STV, maximin, and ranked pairs. We recall Condition 5: There exists a profile P such that: (a) P and Dm(P ) are both stable, (b) r(P ) = c1, and (c) r(Dm(P )) = c2.
A positional scoring rule is nontrivial if it is defined by a score vector (s1, . . . , sm) for which s1 > sm. 
We now show that Ps = P1 + P2 satisfies Condition 5 in Theorem 2. We need to check that rs(Ps) = c1, rs(Dm(Ps)) = c2, and both Ps and Dm(Ps) are stable.
It is easy to check that rs(Ps) = c1. We now show that rs(Dm(Ps)) = c2. The score of c2 in Dm(Ps) is higher than the score of c1 in Dm(Ps), because they get the same score in Dm(P2), c2 gets a(
Hence, because b > a and s1 ≥ s2 > s k , we know that the score of c2 is higher than that of c1 in Dm(Ps).
Also, the score of c2 is higher than the score of cm, because the score of c2 is:
=the score of cm
The last inequality follows from the facts that m ≥ 4 and s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm. Similarly, we can prove that for any i ≥ 3, the score of c2 is higher than the score of ci. Since the inequality is strict in each case, we know that Ps and Dm(Ps) are stable. This completes the proof of the first case (s2 > sm).
In the second case, s1 > s2 = . . . = sm (the plurality rule). In this case let Ps = 3(c1 c2 cm others) + 2(c2 c1 cm others) + 2(cm c2 c1 others). It is easy to check that rs(Ps) = c1 and rs(Dm(Ps)) = c2, and for both P2 and Dm(Ps), the scores of the winners are strictly larger than the scores of other alternatives, which means that Ps and Dm(Ps) are stable.
So any nontrivial positional scoring rule satisfies Condition 5 in Theorem 2. In Dm(Ps), the minimum pairwise score of c1 is no more than 3, because c1 is ahead of c2 in only 3 votes. The minimum pairwise score of c2 is more than 11 3 because c2 is ahead of c1 in 4 votes, and ahead of cm in 3· votes. c2 also defeats all the other alternatives (c3, . . . , cm−1) in their pairwise elections. So, c2 is the Condorcet winner, which means that Maximin(Dm(Ps)) = RankedP airs(Dm(Ps)) = c2. For STV, in the first round, all of c3, . . . , cm−1 are eliminated; then, in the second round, since c2 is ranked first (among the remaining alternatives) the greatest number of times, either c1 or cm will be eliminated. In either case c2 is still ranked first (among the remaining alternatives) the greatest number of times in the third round. Therefore, ST V (Dm(Ps)) = c2. Both Ps and Dm(Ps) are stable because there is no tie in any pairwise election or in any step of STV. 
CONCLUSIONS
By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, for any voting rule that satisfies non-dictatorship and non-imposition, if there are three or more alternatives, then there exists a successful manipulation. Recently, a quantitative version of this result was proved by Friedgut et al. [9] . This new theorem relates the distance between a neutral voting rule and the set of dictatorships to the probability that a random manipulation (from a random profile) will succeed, when the number of alternatives is three. (Here, "random" means uniformly random.) Unfortunately, it does not seem that the proof for that result can be easily extended to more than three alternatives.
In this paper, we considered a different (incomparable) set of conditions under which a similar result holds for more than three alternatives. We showed that if a voting rule satisfies homogeneity, anonymity, non-imposition, a canceling-out condition, and a stability condition, then there exists at least one voter such that a random manipulation for this voter will succeed with a probability of Ω( 1 n ). (We note that we did not assume neutrality.) We showed that any positional scoring rule, STV, Copeland with five or more alternatives, maximin, and ranked pairs satisfy these conditions.
Apart from the fact that it is restricted to three alternatives, the theorem by Friedgut et al. is a very general result about voting rules: it only requires that the voting rule is neutral (and the result depends on the distance to dictatorial rules). The conditions for our theorem are technically incomparable because we do not assume neutrality, but in practice they seem more restrictive: although some common voting rules satisfy them, other rules do not. Therefore, we still consider it an important open problem to generalize the theorem by Friedgut et al. to four or more alternatives, perhaps with some additional assumptions that are less restrictive than the ones in this paper. Additionally, in this paper, we treated m, the number of alternatives, as a constant, and because of that we did not consider the dependence of the probability of success on m. Another interesting question is how these results generalize to coalitional manipulation. Once all these questions are settled, we should re-evaluate the agenda of preventing manipulation by making it computationally hard.
